

PSCI 420: The Nuclear Revolution

**Williams College
Fall 2018**

Professor Galen Jackson

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Class Meeting Time: Wednesdays, 1:10-3:50 p.m.

Office Hours: Mondays, 2-4 p.m. and by appointment

Course Description

This is a class about international politics in the nuclear age. In broad terms, it focuses on a very basic question: Does international politics still work essentially the same way as it did in the pre-nuclear era, or has it undergone a “revolution,” in the most fundamental sense of the word? More specifically, the course addresses a number of major conceptual and strategic debates in the field of nuclear security studies: Do core political considerations play the same role that they did prior to 1945 in shaping state behavior, or has the advent of nuclear weapons altered the situation in a fundamental way? Do nuclear weapons have any meaningful political value? Can they be used effectively to coerce a state’s adversaries? What is the morality of using nuclear forces, or of relying on them for deterrent purposes? Is preventive war ever a justifiable policy in the nuclear age? Is the concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD) valid? Do nuclear weapons have a stabilizing or destabilizing effect on the international system? Does nuclear superiority matter? Does the balance of resolve? How should the world approach the question of nuclear proliferation? And why, despite their having come on the world scene more than seven decades ago, have nuclear weapons not been used in war since August 1945?

To deal with these important questions, this course will combine political science concepts with an historical approach to the evidence, with the objective of gaining key theoretical, empirical, and policy insights about the nuclear age. The class begins with a basic overview of key concepts in nuclear physics and a brief outline of the key breakthroughs that led to the discovery of fission in 1938-1939. In addition, we will spend part of one class session discussing what accounted for the success of the Manhattan Project. On October 17, we will also discuss the risks and potential promise of nuclear energy programs with a guest speaker, Professor Paasha Mahdavi.

The heart of the course, however, will center on a series of major historical and conceptual debates. Specifically, the class will examine President Truman’s decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki; the decision to grant the American president more or less sole authority to utilize the country’s nuclear arsenal; arms control efforts; Truman’s decision to build thermonuclear weapons; the Soviet nuclear program; whether nuclear weapons exacerbated, alleviated, or had little impact one way or the other on Cold War tensions; the dilemmas posed by extended deterrence; preventive war pressures in a nuclear world; the Berlin and Cuban missile crises; the advent of strategic parity between the superpowers and the question of

whether nuclear superiority played a role in how the end of the Cold War ran its course; the debate about whether nuclear proliferation is stabilizing or destabilizing; the nonproliferation regime; and regional powers' respective nuclear programs. With respect to the latter, the course will examine a number of countries that succeeded in acquiring nuclear weapons—including China, Israel, India, Pakistan, and South Africa—as well as those that did not, such as Iraq, Libya, South Korea, and Taiwan. The course will conclude with a session where students debate one another on a number of contemporary issues in the field: What should be done about Iran and North Korea? What are the prospects for disarmament in an era of technological innovation? And how confident should we be that nuclear war can be avoided in the future?

Course Requirements and Format

Class Participation and Reading

This is a 400-level *seminar*—quite simply, this class will not work without consistent input from students, and regular attendance is therefore a key requirement. Although I will typically begin most class sessions by providing some background and context related to the day's topic and readings, class participation is critically important and expected of each and every student. Class discussion is *the heart of this course*—it is during these discussions that we will really wrestle with the fundamental issues at stake. Students should come to class ready to talk, having thought seriously about the major concepts raised in the readings. For that reason, it is absolutely essential that students complete the assigned reading *before* each class. I expect students to come to class prepared to discuss the readings, ask questions, and engage with their peers. I reserve the right to “cold call” students if I think it will contribute to the class discussion. If you don't want to participate in class, then this course, frankly, is probably not for you. The basic format for each session will be “Socratic,” meaning I will ask questions and structure the debate to get students to express key ideas and to think analytically. If you have to miss a class, be sure to inform me well ahead of time and be prepared to make it up. Because of its importance, **class participation will account for 30 percent of the final grade.** Students will be graded on both attendance and the quality of their preparation.

Short Presentations

Each class, two students will be responsible for presenting on a reading or set of readings we will be discussing that day for roughly 5-10 minutes. The purpose of these short presentations is to frame the discussion for the rest of the class. Students should present their basic reactions to the issues raised in the readings. **Each of these presentations will be worth 5 percent of your grade (10 percent total).** Students will sign up for the class they want to present on during the organizational meeting on Thursday, September 6.

Three Analytical Essays

Students will also be required to write three analytical papers, 5-7 pages in length, which will deal with particular topics we have covered in class. Students will be given a choice of different topics to write about. I will hand out the different essay prompts roughly 7-10 days prior to when each is due. The papers will be evaluated based on the quality of their writing; demonstrated

knowledge of the subject material and readings; and, above all, the persuasiveness and clarity of the analytical argument they make. It is much better to write a paper with a bad argument than one with no argument at all. Papers that merely summarize the material we have discussed—even though they may demonstrate that one has carefully done the assigned reading—will not fare as well as papers that incorporate less of the subject matter but take a clear position. The most important thing is for students to *advance a clear, compelling, and analytical argument*. I will go over in class more thoroughly what I am expecting.

The papers will not require any additional research beyond the assigned readings (please see me ahead of time if you are thinking about using any outside sources; in general, I tend to discourage students from doing this). Papers must include references to the readings using properly formatted citations. This can be done either through footnotes or parenthetical notation, and I will go over in class how to do this. There is also an excellent citation guide on the College's library website. I encourage students to take advantage of the Writing Workshop—a truly wonderful resource—to get feedback on their writing mechanics.

The first paper is due by midnight on Monday, October 15; the second paper is due by midnight on Friday, November 16; and the last paper is due by midnight on Wednesday, December 12. Each paper will be worth 20 percent of the final grade. Late papers will be penalized a half letter grade per day past the deadline.

Since I am requiring you to write papers, it is only fair that I provide you with extensive and thoughtful comments once I have read them. I urge students to consider my feedback carefully. The goal is to make you all better writers and thinkers. If you have questions about what I have written on your paper, please drop by my office hours to discuss them.

How to Read and Write for this Course

A key goal of this course is to help students improve their ability to read critically. Everything we will read advances a basic point. While doing the assigned reading, students should ask themselves a series of questions: What is the author's basic argument? What is the logic that supports that argument? Is the evidence that she/he brings to bear compelling? Students who read actively in this way will not only absorb the material more thoroughly, but will also come to class ready to participate with greater confidence. The goal should be to dissect the piece—to understand its logical and empirical weaknesses/strengths and to comprehend its significance in conceptual, historical, and policy terms.

Writing development is also an important objective for this course. The ability to write well is an invaluable skill, one that will benefit students well into the future. The analytical paper must have a clear thesis statement (typically stated at the end of the first paragraph) and the logical/empirical arguments students include in their papers should be geared toward supporting that statement. I am happy to discuss the structure, logic, and evidence relating to student essays during office hours, but I will not read rough drafts.

Office Hours

Please feel free to send me an email to set up an appointment or simply come by my office on Mondays between 2 and 4 p.m. I am happy to talk about anything related to the course, to answer any questions you might have, and to discuss how to approach the papers and exams. In my experience, office hours can present an excellent opportunity for students to enhance their comprehension of the concepts we discuss in class and to develop a framework for their papers, so I encourage everyone who feels they need help—or is simply interested in further discussion of the class material—to set up a meeting.

Academic Integrity and the Honor Code

All submitted work must be your own. I take plagiarism and cheating extremely seriously and will not hesitate to pursue the maximum penalty allowed by the College. If you are confused about what might constitute plagiarism or cheating, or have questions about specific aspects of the Honor Code, feel free to come talk to me or to consult the many resources the College provides to help students in this area. I am always happy to advise students about this issue.

On the issue of student collaboration, my policy is straightforward. There is absolutely nothing wrong with students exchanging ideas about what they plan to do in their papers. In fact, I welcome that sort of collaboration (group discussions of this sort can be especially fruitful, by the way, during office hours). **However, all written work must be done independently and students must formulate their own arguments in their papers.**

Issues of Health and Accessibility of Key Resources

Students with disabilities who may need an accommodation can contact Dr. G.L. Wallace at x4672. In addition, students experiencing physical or mental health challenges that is affecting their academic performance can come speak with me or with a dean so that they can be given access to the right resources. The deans can be reached at x4171.

A Note about Classroom Inclusivity

Some of the topics we will study in this class are controversial. It is only natural that students will disagree with me and with each other about certain concepts and events covered in this course. That is no bad thing—having these debates is vitally important to improving our collective understanding of issues in nuclear security studies. So please feel free to express your opinions confidently in this class.

On the other hand, **I will not tolerate students being disrespectful to each other.** Again, debating the issues is both healthy and productive. But class can only take place in an environment where everyone feels welcome and able to express themselves.

With that in mind, I want to remind students that the College is committed to embracing diversity of age, background, beliefs, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, gender expression, national origin, religious affiliation, sexual orientation, and other visible and nonvisible

categories. If you feel you are not being welcomed in this class or that it suffers from a lack of inclusivity, please come talk to me or to a college administrator to share your concerns.

A Few Things to Keep in Mind

There are no assigned books for this class. The readings will all be included in a series of course packets, which students can pick up from the packet room. **I reserve the right to make changes to the assigned reading if I think it will contribute to the course.**

Some of what we study in this class can be hard to talk about. Whenever nuclear war is the topic of discussion there are going to be some very troubling aspects of the conversation. If you find you are having difficulties for this reason, please come speak to me and I'm sure we can work something out.

Course Schedule

Thursday, September 6: Organizational Meeting (no reading)

Wednesday, September 12: The Nuclear Age Begins (201 pages)

Richard Wolfson, *Nuclear Choices: A Citizen's Guide to Nuclear Technology*, Revised Edition (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), pp. 15-38, 95-96, 101-118, 289-304, 315-337.

Owen Cote, Jr., "Weapons of Mass Confusion," *Boston Review*, April 1, 2003.

McGeorge Bundy, *Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years* (New York: Random House, 1988), pp. 4-11, 14-53.

Gar Alperovitz, "Did America Have to Drop the Bomb? Not to End the War, But Truman Wanted to Intimidate Russia," *Washington Post*, August 4, 1985.

Ward Wilson, "The Winning Weapon? Rethinking Nuclear Weapons in Light of Hiroshima," *International Security*, Vol. 31, No. 4 (2007), pp. 162-179.

Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (New York: Basic, 1977), pp. 262-267.

Robert James Mattox, "Atomic Diplomacy: A Study in Creative Writing," *Journal of American History*, Vol. 59, No. 4 (1973), pp. 925-934.

Henry L. Stimson, "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb," *Harpers*, Vol. 194, No. 1161 (1947), pp. 97-107 (reprinted in *SALS Review*, Vol. 5, No. 2 [1985], pp. 1-15).

Paul Fussell, "Thank God for the Atom Bomb," *The New Republic*, August 1981.

Wednesday, September 19: The Early Cold War and the Soviet Bomb Project (139 pages)

Alex Wellerstein, “No One Can Stop President Trump from Using Nuclear Weapons: That’s By Design,” *Washington Post*, December 1, 2016.

Sean Illing, “Trump Can’t Start a Nuclear War by Himself, But There’s Not Much Stopping Him,” *Vox*, November 17, 2017.

Dave Merrill, Nafeesa Syeed, and Brittany Harris, “To Launch a Nuclear Strike, President Trump Would Take These Steps,” *Bloomberg*, January 20, 2017.

Michael E. O’Hanlon, “Going It Alone? The President and the Risks of a Hair-Trigger Nuclear Button,” *Brookings*, March 1, 2016.

Brendan Rittenhouse Green, “The President and Nuclear Weapons Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Trump Having the Bomb,” *War on the Rocks*, September 25, 2017.

Wolfson, *Nuclear Choices*, pp. 97-100, 304-307.

Bundy, *Danger and Survival*, pp. 158-161, 176-184, 197-231.

David Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), pp. 116-133, 253-272.

Rosemary J. Foote, “Nuclear Coercion and the Ending of the Korean Conflict,” *International Security*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (1988-1989), pp. 92-112.

Wednesday, September 26: Nuclear Deterrence and the German Question (150 pages)

Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 605-610.

Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 35-49, 69-78, 92-109, 116-125.

Michael Krepon, “The Stability-Instability Paradox,” *Arms Control Wonk*, November 2, 2010.

Francis J. Gavin, *Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America’s Atomic Age* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012), pp. 30-56.

Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. vii-x, 146-200.

Wednesday, October 3: The Berlin and Cuban Missile Crises (166 pages)

Fred Kaplan, “JFK’s First-Strike Plan,” *The Atlantic*, October 2001.

Michael Dobbs, *One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War* (New York: Vintage, 2008), pp. 3-57, 276-320.

Francis J. Gavin, "Lessons from the Cuban Missile Crisis," *The National Interest*, October 26, 2012.

Leslie H. Gelb, "The Myth That Screwed Up 50 Years of U.S. Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy*, October 8, 2012.

Stephen Sestanovich, "Of Myths and Missiles," *Foreign Policy*, October 12, 2012.

Benjamin Schwarz, "The Real Cuban Missile Crisis," *The Atlantic*, January/February 2013.

Daniel Ellsberg, "The Day Castro Almost Started World War III," *New York Times*, October 31, 1987.

Primary Documents:

- John Ausland, "A Nuclear War to Keep Berlin Open?" *International Herald Tribune*, June 19, 1991.
- Excerpt of Record of Meeting of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Berlin Contingency Planning, June 16, 1961, in United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1961-1963, Vol. 14: Berlin Crisis, 1961-1962* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office [GPO], 1993), pp. 119-122.
- Letter from President John Kennedy to His Representative in Berlin, Lucius Clay, October 8, 1961, in *FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 14*, pp. 484-486.
- Memorandum of Conversation (Memcon), "Subject: Berlin," October 9, 1962, in *FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 15*, pp 351-355.
- Summary Record of the 517th Meeting of the National Security Council, September 12, 1963, in *FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 8*, pp. 499-507.
- Transcript of Recorded Meeting between President John F. Kennedy and Advisers, October 19, 1962, in Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, eds., *The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 173-188.
- Telegram from Cuban President Fidel Castro to Soviet General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev, October 26, 1962, Wilson Center Digital Archive
- Letter from Khrushchev to Castro, October 28, 1962, Wilson Center Digital Archive

- The Polyansky Report on Khrushchev's Mistakes in Foreign Policy, October 1964, Wilson Center Digital Archive

Wednesday, October 10: Preventive War Thinking in a Nuclear World (159 pages)

Marc Trachtenberg, "'A Wasting Asset': American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance, 1949-1954," *International Security*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (1988-1989), pp. 5-49.

William Burr and Jeffrey T. Richelson, "Whether to 'Strangle the Baby in the Cradle': The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960-64," *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (2000-2001), pp. 54-99.

Hal Brands and David Palkki, "Saddam, Israel, and the Bomb: Nuclear Alarmism Justified?" *International Security*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (2011), pp. 133-166.

Dan Reiter, "Preventive Attacks Against Nuclear Programs and the 'Success' at Osiraq," *Nonproliferation Review*, Vol. 12, No. 2 (2005), pp. 355-371.

Richard K. Betts, "The Osirak Fallacy," *The National Interest*, March 1, 2006.

John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "An Unnecessary War," *Foreign Policy*, No. 134 (January/February 2003), pp. 50-59.

Kenneth M. Pollack, "Next Stop Baghdad?" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 2 (2003), pp. 32-47.

Wednesday, October 17: The Promise and Risks of Nuclear Energy (117 pages)

Guest Lecturer: Professor Paasha Mahdavi, University of California-Santa Barbara

Wolfson, *Nuclear Choices*, pp. 182-212.

Nathan E. Hultman, "The Political Economy of Nuclear Energy," *WIREs Climate Change*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (2011), pp. 397-411.

Yury Yudin, "Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation," in Andreas Goldthau, ed., *The Handbook of Global Energy Policy* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2013), pp. 205-223.

President Dwight Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" Address to the United Nations General Assembly, December 8, 1953

1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

Leonard Weiss, "Atoms for Peace," *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 59, No. 6 (2003), pp. 34-44.

Michael Totty, "The Case For and Against Nuclear Power," *Wall Street Journal*, June 30, 2008.

Ernest Moniz, “Why We Still Need Nuclear Power,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 90, No. 6 (2011), pp. 83-94.

John Matson, “What Happens During a Nuclear Meltdown?” *Scientific American*, March 15, 2011.

Charles D. Ferguson, “Japan Melted Down, But That Doesn’t Mean the End of the Atomic Age,” *Foreign Policy*, No. 189 (2011), pp. 49-53.

Brad Plumer, “U.S. Nuclear Comeback Stalls as Two Reactors Are Abandoned,” *New York Times*, July 31, 2017.

Brad Plumer, “How Retiring Nuclear Power Plants May Undercut U.S. Climate Goals,” *New York Times*, June 13, 2017.

Wednesday, October 24: The Age of Parity and the Superiority Question (144 pages)

Robert Jervis, “Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn’t Matter,” *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 94, No. 4 (1979-1980), pp. 617-633.

Matthew Kroenig, “Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve: Explaining Nuclear Crisis Outcomes,” *International Organization*, Vol. 67, No. 1 (2013), pp. 141-171.

Francis J. Gavin, “What We Talk About When We Talk About Nuclear Weapons,” *H-Diplo/ISSF*, Forum No. 2 (2014), pp. 11-36.

Brendan Rittenhouse Green and Austin Long, “The MAD Who Wasn’t There: Soviet Reactions to the Late Cold War Nuclear Balance,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 4 (2017), pp. 606-641.

Primary Documents:

- Excerpt of Minutes a National Security Council Meeting, February 4, 1969, in *FRUS, 1969-1976*, Vol. 23, p. 27.
- Excerpts of Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting, February 19, 1969
- Memcon, “Subject: NSC Meeting—NATO & MBFR,” November 19, 1970
- Excerpt of an Editorial Note, in *FRUS, 1969-1976*, Vol. 14, pp. 74-75
- Excerpts of Memcon between National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger and French President Georges Pompidou, May 18, 1973
- Memcon, December 19, 1974, in *FRUS, 1969-1976*, Vol. 16, pp. 387-388.

- Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, “Subject: Middle East,” January 14, 1975, in *FRUS, 1969-1976*, Vol. 26, pp. 476-490.

SPECIAL CLASS MEETING, OCTOBER 30, 8 p.m.: Watch *Dr. Strangelove*

Wednesday, October 31: The Proliferation Debate (91 pages)

Kenneth N. Waltz, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 91, No. 4 (2012), pp. 2-5.

Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Great Debate: Is Nuclear Zero the Best Option,” *The National Interest* (September/October 2010), pp. 88-96.

Pauline Jelinek, “70 Punished in Accidental B-52 Flight,” *Washington Post*, October 19, 2007.

Dobbs, *One Minute to Midnight*, pp. 132-134, 254-275.

“US Nearly Detonated Atomic Bomb over North Carolina,” *The Guardian*, September 20, 2013.

John Mueller, “The Atomic Terrorist?” *Cato Institute Nuclear Proliferation Update*, January 2010.

Graham Allison, “A Response to Nuclear Terrorism Skeptics,” *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2009), pp. 31-44.

David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, “Unraveling the A.Q. Khan and Future Proliferation Networks,” *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 28, No. 2 (2005), pp. 111-128.

William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, “North Korea’s Missile Success Is Linked to Ukrainian Plant, Investigators Say,” *New York Times*, August 14, 2017.

Marc Trachtenberg, “Waltzing to Armageddon,” *The National Interest*, No. 69 (2002), pp. 144-152.

Wednesday, November 7: Dilemmas of Nonproliferation (156 pages)

Mira Rapp-Hooper, “Trump’s Nuclear Views Are Terrifying,” *USA Today*, March 29, 2016.

Gene Gerzhoy and Nicholas L. Miller, “Donald Trump Thinks More Countries Should Have Nuclear Weapons—Here’s What the Research Says,” *Washington Post Monkey Cage*, April 6, 2016.

Zack Beauchamp, “Trump’s Comments on Japanese Nukes Are Worrisome—Even by Trump’s Standards,” *Vox*, March 31, 2016.

Rebecca K.C. Hersman and Robert Peters, “Nuclear U-Turns: Learning from South Korean and

Taiwanese Rollback,” *Nonproliferation Review*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (2006), pp. 539-553.

Thomas P. Cavanna, “Geopolitics over Proliferation: The Origins of US Grand Strategy and Their Implications for the Spread of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia,” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 41, No. 4 (2018), pp. 576-603.

Rabia Akhtar, “The Correct Narrative on Pressler,” *Dawn*, May 29, 2017.

Or Rabinowitz and Nicholas L. Miller, “Keeping the Bombs in the Basement: U.S. Nonproliferation Policy toward Israel, South Africa, and Pakistan,” *International Security*, Vol. 40, No. 1 (2015), pp. 47-60, 70-86.

Avner Cohen and William Burr, “How the Israelis Hoodwinked JFK on Going Nuclear,” *Foreign Policy*, April 26, 2016.

Primary Documents:

- Memo from National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski to President Jimmy Carter, “Subject: Reflections on Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan,” December 26, 1979
- Note from Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to Ambassador-at-Large Gerard Smith, January 31, 1980, enclosing excerpts from Memcons between Brown and Chinese Officials
- Rick Atkinson, “Use in Arms Feared,” *Washington Post*, July 21, 1984.
- Department of State Action Memo from Arnold Kanter and Richard Murphy to Michael Armacost, “Memo on Pakistan Nuclear Issue for the NSC,” August 24, 1984
- Letter from President Ronald Reagan to President Zia-ul-Haq, September 12, 1984
- Memcon, “Subject: Conversation between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Ben Gurion,” May 30, 1961, in *FRUS, 1961-1963*, Vol. 17, pp. 134-135.
- Assistant Secretary of State Philips Talbot’s Notes of the Meeting between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, May 30, 1961
- National Intelligence Estimate 35-61, “The Outlook for Israel,” October 5, 1961, pp. 2, 6-7
- Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel, May 18, 1963, in *FRUS, 1962-1963*, Vol. 18, pp. 543-544.
- Memo for the Record, “Subject: President’s Talk with Israeli Foreign Minister Eban,” February 9, 1966, in *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. 18, pp. 547-549.

- Memcon, “Subject: Nuclear Proliferation,” February 9, 1966, in *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. 18, pp. 549-550.
- Memo of Telephone Conversation between Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, November 1, 1968, in *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. 20, pp. 585-586.
- National Security Decision Memorandum 6, “Presidential Decision to Ratify Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,” February 5, 1969
- Memcon, “Subject: Review Group Consideration of Response to NSSM-40, June 26, 1969,” June 30, 1969
- Memo by National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger to President Richard Nixon, “Summary of the Situation and Issues,” July 19, 1969

Wednesday, November 14: Regional Powers I (168 pages)

Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 3 (1996-1997), pp. 54-86.

John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, *China Builds the Bomb* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 1-72.

Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, “Why China Won’t Abandon Its Nuclear Strategy of Assured Retaliation,” Institute for Security and Conflict Studies Policy Brief, U.S.-China Nuclear Project, February 2016.

Elbridge Colby et al., “The Israeli ‘Nuclear Alert’ of 1973: Deterrence and Signaling in Crisis,” Center for Naval Analyses, April 2013.

Paul C. Avey, “Who’s Afraid of the Bomb? The Role of Nuclear Non-Use Norms in Confrontations between Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Opponents,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (2015), pp. 586-593.

Handout: Egypt’s Views of Israel’s Nuclear Capability

Wednesday, November 21: NO CLASS—THANKSGIVING BREAK

Wednesday, November 28: Regional Powers II (149 pages)

Alexandre Debs and Nuno P. Monteiro, *Nuclear Politics: The Strategic Causes of Proliferation* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 238-245, 326-336.

Jaswant Singh, “Against Nuclear Apartheid,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 77, No. 5 (1998), pp. 41-52.

Vipin Narang, "Posturing for Peace? Pakistan's Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability," *International Security*, Vol. 34, No. 3 (2009-2010), pp. 38-78.

S. Paul Kapur, "India and Pakistan's Unstable Peace: Why Nuclear South Asia Is Not Like Cold War Europe," *International Security*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (2005), pp. 127-152.

J.W. de Villiers, Roger Jardine, and Mitchell Reiss, "Why South Africa Gave Up the Bomb," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 5 (1993), pp. 98-109.

Anna-Mart van Wyk, "South Africa's Nuclear Programme and the Cold War," *History Compass*, Vol. 8, No. 7 (2010), pp. 562-572.

Malfrid Braut-Hegghammer, "Why North Korea Succeeded at Getting Nuclear Weapons—When Iraq and Libya Failed," *Washington Post Monkey Cage*, January 2, 2018.

Malfrid Braut-Hegghammer, *Unclear Physics: Why Iraq and Libya Failed to Build Nuclear Weapons* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016), pp. 196-217.

Flynt Leverett, "Why Libya Gave up on the Bomb," *New York Times*, January 23, 2004.

Wednesday, December 5: Contemporary Debates (132 pages)

Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, "The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 2 (2006), pp. 42-54.

Eric Schlosser, "The Growing Dangers of the New Nuclear-Arms Race," *The New Yorker*, May 24, 2018.

Nicholas L. Miller and Vipin Narang, "North Korea Defied the Theoretical Odds: What Can We Learn from Its Successful Nuclearization?" *Texas National Security Review*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2018), pp. 58-74.

David E. Sanger, "North Korea's Trump-Era Strategy: Keep Making A-Bombs, but Quietly," *New York Times*, September 16, 2018.

Kevin R. James, "North Korea: Why War is the Only Option Now," *The National Interest*, November 29, 2017.

Matthew Kroenig, "Time to Attack Iran: Why a Strike is the Least Bad Option," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 91, No. 1 (2012), pp. 76-86.

Colin H. Kahl, "Not Time to Attack Iran: Why War Should Be a Last Resort," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 91, No. 2 (2012), pp. 166-173.

"A 'Blunder' or 'Much-Needed Move': HKS Faculty and Scholars React to President Trump's

Decision to Pull Out of the Iran Deal,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, May 9, 2018.

Sean Illing, “Why Trump is Right to Pull Out of the Iran Nuclear Deal,” *Vox*, May 8, 2018.

Philip Gordon, “Trump is About to Provoke an Unnecessary Crisis with Iran,” *The Atlantic*, May 6, 2018.

Zack Beauchamp, “It’s Nearly Unanimous: Foreign Policy Experts Think Trump Made the Wrong Choice on Iran,” *Vox*, May 9, 2018.

John Mueller, *Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 29-33.

Nina Tannenwald, “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use,” *International Organization*, Vol. 53, No. 3 (1999), pp. 433-468.