

PSCI 327: Leadership and Grand Strategy

**Williams College
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Course Description

This class is about the role of leaders and statecraft. It will address some of the most enduring questions in international relations: What is leadership and why does it matter? Do individuals have the capacity to shape outcomes in a significant way, or are their preferences typically overwhelmed by structural forces at the international or domestic level? Is it possible for national security officials to devise and implement coherent, effective grand strategies, or do they simply formulate most policies reactively, essentially in an ad hoc manner? And how great a role do luck and randomness play in strategic interactions? The course will consider these questions from an interdisciplinary perspective that combines political science and history. The purpose of this method is to utilize key conceptual arguments to gain greater leverage for the examination of major historical decisions in national security policy. The class will begin with a conceptual overview of the structure of international politics and of how to think about strategic objectives and decision-making. We will also examine some of the key constraints leaders confront when attempting to achieve their political goals. We will then move into the heart of the course—examining cases of decision-makers in action. Specifically, the course will cover the diplomacy of Woodrow Wilson and the path to American intervention in the First World War; the contrasting views between Neville Chamberlain and Winston Churchill on the issue of British appeasement of Nazi Germany; Franklin Roosevelt and U.S. entry into World War II; Harry Truman's decision to drop the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki; the origins of the Cold War; John Kennedy, Nikita Khrushchev, and the Cuban Missile Crisis; the U.S. attitude toward the spread of nuclear weapons, through the lens of the Israeli case; the May-June 1967 Middle East crisis; Anwar Sadat and the October 1973 Middle East War; U.S.-Soviet diplomacy and the collapse of superpower détente; Jimmy Carter and the Camp David Accords; strategic blunders, including the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, the Vietnam War, and the Bush administration's decision to invade Iraq in 2003; and the leadership of Barack Obama. We will finish the class by debating a contemporary policy issue and what role leadership might play in resolving it. Students will be asked to analyze and evaluate the strategic choices we examine, as well as the process by which they were reached. The primary objective of the course is for students to improve their understanding of the role and importance of individual leadership and strategic choice in international politics.

Course Requirements and Format

This is an upper-level seminar and class discussion is critically important. Student participation in class discussion is *the heart of this course* and I expect regular and active participation from each and every student. Students should come to class on time having thought seriously about the major questions and arguments from the readings, ready to talk, to ask questions, and to engage with their peers. Our goal is to comprehend, analyze, and evaluate cases of strategic decision-making and leadership, and students who come to class unprepared or unwilling to participate will get little of value out of this course. It is the students, rather than myself, who will be driving the conversation. I will employ the “Socratic” method, i.e., I will structure the class discussion and ask questions, but it is students who will be debating the subject material analytically. If you have to miss a class, make sure to inform me ahead of time and be prepared to make it up. Because of its importance, **class participation will account for 30 percent of the final grade.**

You will also be writing two papers in this class. The first one will be a 4-5 page analytical essay. You will be asked either to weigh in on one of the key historical debates we have covered in class or to evaluate the leadership and strategic decision-making in a particular case. I will provide a list of possible paper topics for this paper by the first week of March. The paper will be due the Thursday prior to Spring Break, March 16. We will not meet as a class that day because I want to give you the chance to focus on your papers. **Each of these papers will be worth 20 percent of the final grade.** Late submissions will be penalized a half letter grade for every day they are overdue.

Students will be evaluated based on the quality of their writing; demonstrated knowledge of the subject material and readings; and, above all, the persuasiveness and clarity of the analytical argument they make in these papers. It is much better to write a paper with a bad argument than one with no argument at all. Likewise, papers that merely summarize the material we have discussed—even though they may demonstrate that one has carefully done the assigned reading—will not fare as well as papers that incorporate less of the subject matter but that take a clear position. The most important thing in these papers is for students to advance a clear, thoughtful, compelling, and *analytical argument*.

These papers will not require any additional research beyond the assigned readings. Papers must include references to the readings using properly formatted citations. This can be done either through footnotes or parenthetical notation, and I will go over in class how to do this. There is also an excellent citation guide on the College’s library website. I encourage students to take advantage of the Writing Workshop—a truly wonderful resource—to get feedback on their writing mechanics and paper structure.

You will also be writing a research paper, 12-15 pages in length, which will count for 50 percent of your grade. In these papers, you will examine, in-depth, a particular historical case and evaluate the leadership displayed and strategic approach taken by a key decision-maker or set of decision-makers. There are any number of topics that students may choose—they can be a more thorough examination of one of the cases we cover in class or a new topic—but the subject must be related to individual leadership and strategic decision-making. These papers will be graded on both the quality of the analytical argument they make and the empirical support they provide for that argument, meaning students will have to do outside research as part of this project. The paper will require you to use some combination of primary and secondary sources

(if you choose to write about a topic for which primary documents are unavailable, you will need to collect an alternative set of reliable sources). I will discuss these papers more during the first few weeks of the course.

Students will need to meet with me to discuss their paper topics. I strongly recommend that you see me as early as possible in the semester, but you must come by to discuss your paper with me no later than the last week before spring break (again, I would highly recommend coming earlier). You will need, once you have decided on a topic, to provide me with a one-page description of your proposal (ungraded), which should include a list of sources you will use. As with your analytical essays, your research papers will be evaluated based on their quality of writing and on the strength of the argument they advance. Your grade will also depend on the strength of the evidence you bring to bear in support of your claims. And, as always, you will need to cite your references properly. Research papers will be due during the final exam period. Late submissions will be penalized a half letter grade per day.

How to Read for this Course

A key goal of this course is to help students improve their ability to read and think critically. Everything we will read advances a basic point. While doing the assigned reading, students should ask themselves a series of questions: What is the author's main argument? What is the logic that supports that argument? Is the evidence that she/he brings to bear compelling? Students who read actively in this way will not only absorb the material more thoroughly but will also come to class ready to participate with greater confidence. The goal should be to dissect the piece—to understand its logical and empirical weaknesses/strengths and to comprehend its significance in conceptual and policy terms.

In our investigation of specific cases, we will also be examining a number of primary documents. Students should read these records especially closely; this is your opportunity to develop your own opinions, using direct evidence, about the various decisions we study, and they will allow you to evaluate the various claims scholars make in light of the historical evidence. Indeed, interpreting these documents is one of the most important parts of the course—you will get much more out of the class, especially in terms of your ability to think and read analytically, if you carefully analyze the significance of the primary documents.

Office Hours

I will not have regularly scheduled office hours, but **I am almost always available during the week**. Please feel free to send me an email to set up an appointment. I am happy to talk about anything related to the course, to answer any questions you might have, and to discuss how to approach the papers. In my experience, office hours can present an excellent opportunity for students to enhance their comprehension of the concepts we discuss in class and to develop a framework for their papers, so I encourage everyone who feels they need help—or is simply interested in further discussion of the class material—to set up a meeting.

Academic Integrity and the Honor Code

All submitted work must be your own. I take plagiarism and cheating extremely seriously and will not hesitate to pursue the maximum penalty allowed under the Williams College Honor Code. If you are confused about what might constitute plagiarism or cheating, feel free to ask me or consult the many resources that the College provides to help students in this area.

Course Reading

All of the reading for this course will be available in a course reading packet. Because this is an upper-division seminar, the reading load will be somewhat heavy (approximately 150-200 pages per week). Note, however, that you will be given three days off during the semester to work on your papers. The reading load during the last week of the course will also be relatively light to allow you to devote more time to completing your research papers. Not all of the readings are currently set and I reserve the right to alter the assigned reading if I think it will benefit the class.

Class Schedule

February 1: Introduction to the Course

February 7: Theory, History, and International Order (65 pages)

John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), pp. 29-54, 14-27 (read in that order).

Marc Trachtenberg, "The Problem of International Order and How to Think About It," *The Monist*, Vol. 89, No. 2 (2006), pp. 207-231.

February 9: Grand Strategy and the Primacy of the Political (72 pages)

Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 75-89, 119-121.

Micah Zenko and Rebecca Friedman Lissner, "Trump is Going to Regret Not Having a Grand Strategy," *Foreign Policy*, January 13, 2017.

Richard K. Betts, "Is Strategy an Illusion?" *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 2 (2000), pp. 5-50.

February 14: Domestic Constraints and Foreign Policy (82 pages)

Michael Roskin, "From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: Shifting Generational Paradigms and Foreign Policy," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 89, No. 3 (1974), pp. 567-580.

John Zaller, "Strategic Politicians, Public Opinion, and the Gulf Crisis," in Lance Bennett and David Paletz, eds., *Taken by Storm: The News Media, U.S. Foreign Policy, and the Gulf War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 250-274.

Chaim Kaufmann, "Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas: The Selling of the Iraq War," *International Security*, Vol. 29, No. 1 (2004), pp. 5-48.

February 16: What is Leadership and Why Does it Matter? (73 pages)

Robert Jervis, "Do Leaders Matter and How Would We Know?" *Security Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (2013), pp. 153-179.

Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, "Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In," *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 4 (2001), pp. 107-146.

George F. Kennan, "The G.O.P. Won the Cold War? Ridiculous," *New York Times*, October 28, 1992.

Steve Kornacki, "Why President Gore Might Have Gone into Iraq after 9/11, Too," *Salon*, August 30, 2011.

February 21: Leadership, Strategic Forecasting, and the First World War (93 pages)

Dale C. Copeland, *The Origins of Major War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 79-117.

Paul W. Schroeder, "World War I as Galloping Gertie: A Reply to Joachim Remak," *Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 44, No. 3 (1972), pp. 319-345.

- Primary documents:
 - Memorandum (Memo) F.O. 371/257 by Mr. Eyre Crowe, "Memorandum on the Present State of British Relations with France and Germany," January 1, 1907, in G.P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, eds., *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914*, Vol. 3: *The Testing of the Entente, 1904-6* (London: HMSO, 1928), pp. 397-405, 414-419.
 - Memo by Lord Thomas Sanderson, "Observations on Printed Memorandum on Relations with France and Germany, January 1907," February 21, 1907, in *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, pp. 420-431.

February 23: Woodrow Wilson and the First World War (82 pages)

Michael Lind, *The American Way of Strategy: U.S. Foreign Policy and the American Way of Life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 79-94.

Edward H. Buehrig, "Wilson's Neutrality Re-Examined," *World Politics*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1950), pp. 1-19.

George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,

1984), pp. 55-73.

- Primary documents

- Memo from Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan to President Woodrow Wilson, May 9, 1915
- Excerpts of Memo by Secretary of State Robert Lansing, December 1, 1916
- Letter from Sir Cecil Spring Rice to Sir Edward Grey, September 8, 1914
- Memo by Lansing, “Consideration and Outline of Policies,” July 11, 1915
- Excerpt from the Diary of Edward House, November 4, 1914
- Excerpt from House Diary, December 14, 1916
- Memo of the Cabinet Meeting by Lansing, March 20, 1917
- Wilson’s Address to the Senate, January 22, 1917
- Letter from Lansing to Wilson, May 25, 1916
- Wilson’s Address to a Joint Session of Congress Requesting a Declaration of War, April 2, 1917

February 28: British Appeasement in the 1930s—Chamberlain and Churchill (84 pages)

Robert Burns, “Rumsfeld Warns Against Appeasement,” *Washington Post*, August 30, 2006.

Christopher Layne, “Security Studies and the Use of History: Neville Chamberlain’s Grand Strategy Revisited,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (2008), pp. 397-437.

Richard Bernstein, “No One Thought France Would Fall—Only a Gambler,” Book Review, *New York Times*, November 1, 2000.

- Primary documents:

- Robert Dell, “Chamberlain’s Treason,” *The Nation*, Vol. 146, No. 11 (March 1938), pp. 292-294.
- Letter from Ambassador Nevile Henderson to Foreign Secretary Viscount Halifax, July 26, 1938, in E.L. Woodward and Rohan Butler, eds., assisted by Margaret Lambert, *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, Third Series, Vol. 2: 1938 (London: HMSO, 1949), pp. 10-12.

- Letter from Henderson to the head of the Foreign Office's Central Department William Strang, July 27, 1938, in *Documents on British Foreign Policy*, pp. 13-14.
- Letter from Henderson to Halifax, August 19, 1938, in *Documents on British Foreign Policy*, pp. 120-121.
- Letter from Henderson to Halifax, September 6, 1938, in *Documents on British Foreign Policy*, pp. 250-251.
- Memorandum of of a Conversation (Memcon) between British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and German Chancellor Adolf Hitler at Berchtesgaden, September 15, 1938, in United States Department of State, *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, Vol. 2: *Germany and Czechoslovakia* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1949), pp. 786-798.
- Letter from Hitler to President Franklin Roosevelt, in *Documents on German Foreign Policy*, pp. 960-962.
- Transcript of Conclusion of a Note from General Ismay to the British Cabinet, September 20, 1938
- Winston Churchill's October 5, 1938 Address to the House of Commons
- "'Peace with Honor,' Says Chamberlain," *New York Times*, October 1, 1938.

March 2: Franklin Roosevelt, Public Opinion, and the Road to Pearl Harbor (95 pages)

John M. Schuessler, "The Deception Dividend: FDR's Undeclared War," *International Security*, Vol. 34, No. 4 (2010), pp. 133-165.

Dan Reiter, "Democracy, Deception, and Entry into War," *Security Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (2012), pp. 594-623.

Daniel Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power* (New York: Free Press, 1991), pp. 300-303.

- Primary documents:

- Excerpt of Letter from Chief of Naval Operations Harold Stark to H.E. Kimmel, January 13, 1941
- Letter from Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, June 23, 1941

- Note from Roosevelt to Ickes, June 23, 1941
- Letter from Ickes to Roosevelt, June 23, 1941
- Letter from Ickes to Roosevelt, June 25, 1941
- Excerpts of Memorandum of Conversation (Memcon) between Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles and British Permanent Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs Alexander Cadogan, August 9, 1941, in United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), Diplomatic Papers, 1941*, Vol. 1: *Soviet Union* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1959), pp. 346-349.
- Excerpts of Memcon between President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, August 11, 1941, in *FRUS, 1941*, Vol. 1, pp. 357-360.
- Minutes of British War Cabinet Meeting, August 19, 1941
- Listen to: Abbreviation of FDR Fireside Chat 18 on the *Greer* Incident, September 11, 1941 (8 minutes and 27 seconds)
- Unsent Letter from Ambassador Joseph Grew to Roosevelt, August 14, 1942

March 7: Harry Truman and the Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb (57 pages)

Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, “The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb,” *Harpers*, Vol. 194, No. 1161 (1947), pp. 97-107.

Barton J. Bernstein, “The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 1 (1995), pp. 135-152.

Tom Nichols, “No Other Choice: Why Truman Dropped the Atomic Bomb on Japan,” *The National Interest*, August 6, 2015.

Ward Wilson, “The Winning Weapon? Rethinking Nuclear Weapons in Light of Hiroshima,” *International Security*, Vol. 31, No. 4 (2007), pp. 162-179.

Douglas Lackey, “Why Hiroshima Was Immoral,” *The Philosophical Forum*, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2003), pp. 39-42.

“Hiroshima: Justified Bombings? A Survivor’s Reply,” *New York Times*, August 6, 1995.

Watch Robert McNamara’s Remarks on Proportionality as a Guideline in War, in “The Fog of War,” available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fDT8NdyoWfl> (3 minutes and 55 seconds)

March 9: Truman, Stalin, and the Origins of the Cold War (75 pages)

Melvyn P. Leffler, *The Specter of Communism: The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1917-1953* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994), pp. 33-63.

Robert G. Kaiser, "Churchill-Stalin Agreement Is Reported," *Washington Post*, August 23, 1977.

Ernest May, "America's Berlin: Heart of the Cold War," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 77, No. 4 (1998), pp. 148-152, 159-160.

- Primary documents:
 - Photograph of Churchill-Stalin "Percentages Agreement," October 9, 1944
 - The Bohlen-Robinson Report, December 1945, in *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 1, No. 4 (1977), pp. 389-399.
 - Address by Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin, February 9, 1946
 - George Kennan's "Long Telegram" to Secretary of State James Byrnes, February 22, 1946, in *FRUS, 1946*, Vol. 6: *Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1946), pp. 696-709.
 - Telegram from U.S. Political Adviser for Germany Robert Murphy to Secretary of State George Marshall, June 26, 1948, in *FRUS, 1948*, Vol. 2: *Germany and Austria* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1948), pp. 919-921.
 - Letter from Stalin to Czechoslovak Leader Klement Gottwald, Wilson Center Digital Archive, August 27, 1950

March 14: John Kennedy, Nikita Khrushchev, Berlin, and Cuba (80 pages)

Robert Jervis, "Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn't Matter," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 94, No. 4 (1979-1980), pp. 617-633.

Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *"One Hell of a Gamble": Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), pp. 257-289.

- Primary documents:
 - Excerpt of Record of Meeting of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Berlin Contingency Planning, June 16, 1961, in *FRUS*, Vol. 14: *Berlin Crisis, 1961-1962* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1993), pp. 119-122.
 - President John F. Kennedy's Radio and Television Report to the American People on Berlin, July 25, 1961

- “Khrushchev’s Reply,” *New York Times*, August 8, 1961, p. 28.
- Memo from Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to Kennedy, “Subject: US and Soviet Military Buildup and Probable Effects on Berlin Situation,” June 21, 1962, in *FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 15: Berlin Crisis, 1962-1963* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1994), pp. 192-195.
- Transcript of Recorded Meeting between President Kennedy and His Military Advisers, October 19, 1962, in Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Cambridge: MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 174-188.
- Telegram from Cuban President Fidel Castro to Khrushchev, Wilson Center Digital Archive, October 26, 1962
- Letter from Khrushchev to Castro, October 28, 1962
- The Polyansky Report on Khrushchev’s Mistakes in Foreign Policy, Wilson Center Digital Archive, October 1964

March 16: NO CLASS—FIRST PAPERS DUE

SPRING BREAK—WORK ON RESEARCH PAPERS

April 4: The United States, Nonproliferation, and the Israeli Nuclear Question (72 pages)

Francis J. Gavin, “Strategies of Inhibition: U.S. Grand Strategy, the Nuclear Revolution, and Nonproliferation,” *International Security*, Vol. 40, No. 1 (2015), pp. 9-46.

Joe Cirincione, “Trump’s Nuclear Insanity,” *Politico Magazine*, March 30, 2016.

William Burr and Avner Cohen, “How the Israelis Hoodwinked JFK on Going Nuclear,” *Foreign Policy*, April 26, 2016.

- Primary documents
 - Memo from the Board of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), to Director of Central Intelligence John McCone, “Subject: Consequences of Israeli Acquisition of Nuclear Capability,” in *FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 18: Near East, 1962-1963* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1995), pp. 398-401.
 - Memcon, “Subject: Conversation between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Ben Gurion,” May 30, 1961, in *FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 17: Near East, 1961-1962* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1994), pp. 134-135.

- Excerpts from National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 35-61, “The Outlook for Israel,” October 5, 1961
- Memo from Rodger P. Davies to Philips Talbot, “Subject: Second Inspection of Israel’s Dimona Reactor,” December 27, 1962
- Memo from Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to Kennedy, July 23, 1963, in *FRUS, 1961-1963*, Vol. 18, pp. 650-652.
- Memo from Secretary of State Dean Rusk to President Lyndon Johnson, “Subject: Preventing Nuclear Proliferation in the Near East,” May 10, 1965 in *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. 18, pp. 454-456.
- Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation (Telecon) between Rusk and Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, November 1, 1968, in *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. 20: *Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967-1968* (Washington, D.C.:GPO, 2001), pp. 585-586.
- Message from Komer to National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, March 1, 1965, in *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. 18, pp. 371-372.
- Memo for the Record, “President’s Talk with Israeli Foreign Minister Eban,” February 9, 1966, in *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. 18, pp. 547-548.
- Memo for the Record, “Subject: NSC Ad Hoc Review Group Meeting on NSSM 40—Israeli Nuclear Program,” June 20, 1969, in *FRUS, 1969-1976*, Vol. 23: *Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969-1972* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2015), pp. 116-123.
- Excerpt of the Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group, “Subject: Middle East,” October 15, 1973, in *FRUS, 1969-1976*, Vol. 25, pp. 535-536.

April 6: Israel, Nasser, the Great Powers, and the June 1967 War (73 pages)

Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 221-232.

Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 161-170.

Roland Popp, “Stumbling Decidedly into the Six-Day War,” *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 60, No. 2 (2006), pp. 281-309.

- Primary documents

- Memo for the Record, “Subject: Record of National Security Council Meeting,”

May 24, 1967, in *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. 19: *Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2004), pp. 87-91.

- Memcon between American and Israeli Officials, May 26, 1967, in *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. 19, pp. 140-146.
- Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's Address on the Occasion of Signing a Joint Defense Treaty with Jordan's King Hussein, May 30, 1967
- Message from Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin to President Lyndon Johnson, May 27, 1967, in *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. 19, pp. 159-160.
- Memo by Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to National Security Adviser Walt Rostow, May 31, 1967, in *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. 19, pp. 208-211.
- Memo from the Contingency Work Group on Military Planning to the Middle East Control Group, June 4, 1967, in *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. 19, pp. 280-283.
- General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev's Address to the Plenum of the Central Committee, "On Soviet Policy Following the Israeli Aggression in the Middle East," Wilson Center Digital Archive, June 20, 1967

April 11: Anwar Sadat and the October 1973 War (77 pages)

John J. Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 155-164.

Yergin, *The Prize*, pp. 570-594.

- Primary documents:
 - Memcon of a National Security Council (NSC) Meeting, "Subject: The Middle East," February 26, 1971, in *FRUS, 1969-1976*, Vol. 23: *Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969-1972* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2015), pp. 757-762.
 - Editorial Note, in *FRUS, 1969-1976*, Vol. 23, pp. 827-834.
 - Memo from President Richard Nixon to Secretary of State William Rogers, May 26, 1971, in *FRUS, 1969-1976*, Vol. 23, pp. 856-859.
 - Excerpt of Transcript of a Telephone Conversation between Nixon and National

Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, October 1, 1971, in *FRUS, 1969-1976*, Vol. 13: *Soviet Union: October 1970-October 1971* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2011), pp. 1079-1080.

- Conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, December 9, 1971, in *FRUS, 1969-1976*, Vol. 23, pp. 955-959.
- Notes of the Discussion between Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, Wilson Center Digital Archive, February 5, 1972
- Memcon, “Subject: The Middle East,” May 26, 1972, in *FRUS, 1969-1976*, Vol. 14: *Soviet Union: October 1971-May 1972* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2006), pp. 1128-1139.
- Excerpt of Memo for the President’s File, “Subject: Meeting with Chancellor Willy Brandt,” May 1, 1973, in *FRUS, 1969-1976*, Vol. E-15, Part 2: *Documents on Western Europe* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2014), p. 826.
- Memo for the President’s File, “Subject: President’s Meeting with General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev,” June 23, 1973, in *FRUS, 1969-1976*, Vol. 15: *Soviet Union, June 1972-August 1974* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2011), pp. 538-542.

April 13: Nixon, Kissinger, Brezhnev, and the Collapse of Détente (68 pages)

George W. Ball, “Slogans and Realities,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 47, No. 4 (1969), pp. 623-641.

Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), pp. 228-246.

- Primary documents:
 - “The Quest for Détente,” Statement by the Foreign Policy Task Force of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority, July 31, 1974
 - Telegram from Deputy National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft to Secretary of State Kissinger, October 20, 1973, in *FRUS, 1969-1976*, Vol. 25, pp. 627-629.
 - Message from Brezhnev to Nixon, undated (October 24-25, 1973), in *FRUS, 1969-1976*, Vol. 25, pp. 734-735.
 - Diary Entry of Soviet International Department Analyst Anatoly Chernyaev, November 4, 1973
 - Memcon between Kissinger and French President Georges Pompidou, May 18,

1973, Kissinger Transcripts Collection, Digital National Security Archive

- Memcon, “Subject: U.S.-Soviet Détente,” October 13, 1974, in *FRUS, 1969-1976*, Vol. 16: *August 1974-December 1976* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2012), pp. 154-157.
- Excerpt of Memcon, November 12, 1973, in William Burr, ed., *The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top-Secret Talks in Beijing and Moscow* (New York: New Press, 1998), pp. 187-188.
- Excerpt of Memcon, June 6, 1975, Kissinger Transcripts Collection, Digital National Security Archive

April 18: Heroic Diplomacy? Jimmy Carter and the Camp David Accords (85 pages)

Michael Massing, “The Storm over the Israel Lobby,” *New York Review of Books*, June 8, 2006.

Aaron David Miller, *The Much Too Promised Land: America’s Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace* (New York: Bantam, 2008), pp. 157-190.

- Primary documents:

- Memo from Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan to President Jimmy Carter, June 1977, in *FRUS, 1977-1980*, Vol. 8: *Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977-August 1978* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2013), pp. 279-295.
- Memcon, “Subject: President’s Meeting with President Anwar Sadat,” February 4, 1978, in *FRUS, 1977-1980*, Vol. 8, pp. 988-1002.
- Memo from Presidential Adviser Edward Sanders to Carter and Vice President Walter Mondale, March 6, 1978, in *FRUS, 1977-1980*, Vol. 8, pp. 1031-1035.
- Memo from National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski to Carter, “Subject: Strategy for Camp David,” August 31, 1978, in *FRUS, 1977-1980*, Vol. 9: *Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978-December 1980* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2014), pp. 60-64.

April 20: NO CLASS—WORK ON RESEARCH PAPERS

April 25: The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (57 pages)

Artemy Kalinovsky, “Decision-Making and the Soviet War in Afghanistan: From Intervention to Withdrawal,” *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 4 (2009), pp. 46-72.

Jonathan Haslam, *Russia’s Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall* (New

Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011), pp. 319-327.

- Primary documents:
 - Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Discussions on Afghanistan, Wilson Center Digital Archive, March 17, 1979
 - CPSU CC Politburo Meeting Minutes (excerpt), Wilson Center Digital Archive, November 13, 1986

April 27: NO CLASS—WORK ON RESEARCH PAPERS

May 2: Lyndon Johnson and the Vietnam War (72 pages)

Fredrik Logevall, “Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2004), pp. 100-112.

Michael Lind, *Vietnam: The Necessary War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1999), pp. 256-284.

- Primary documents:
 - Telecon between President Lyndon Johnson and John S. Knight, February 3, 1964, in Michael Beschloss, ed., *Taking Charge: The Johnson White House Tapes, 1963-1964* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997), pp. 213-214.
 - Telecon between Johnson and National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, February 6, 1964, in *Taking Charge*, pp. 226-227.
 - Memo from National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy to President Johnson, “Basic Policy in Vietnam,” January 27, 1965, in *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. 2: *Vietnam, January-June 1965* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1996), pp. 95-97.
 - Memo from Vice President Hubert Humphrey to Johnson, “Subject: Vietnam,” February 17, 1965, in *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. 2, pp. 309-313.
 - Memo from Undersecretary of State George Ball to Johnson, “Subject: Keeping the Power of Decision in the South Viet-Nam Crisis,” June 18, 1965, in *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. 3: *Vietnam, June-December 1965* (Washington, D.C.:GPO, 1996), pp. 16-21.
 - Notes of Meeting, “Subject: Viet Nam,” July 21, 1965, in *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. 3, pp. 189-197.

- Memo for the Record, “Subject: Meetings on Vietnam,” July 21, 1965, in *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. 3, pp. 197-205.
- Memo from Bundy to Johnson, “Subject: Impressions, Vietnam Discussion,” July 21, 1965, in *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. 3, pp. 207-209.

May 4: George W. Bush and the Iraq War (75 pages)

James Baker III, “Why the U.S. Didn’t March to Baghdad,” *Los Angeles Times*, September 8, 1996.

James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet* (New York: Viking, 2004), pp. 21-36, 79-94, 127-137, 311-331.

Thomas L. Friedman, “Iraq without Saddam,” *New York Times*, September 1, 2002.

Thomas L. Friedman, “You Gotta Have Friends,” *New York Times*, September 29, 2002.

Thomas L. Friedman, “Tell the Truth,” *New York Times*, February 19, 2003.

Thomas L. Friedman, “Bad Planning,” *New York Times*, June 25, 2003.

May 9: The Leadership of Barack Obama (64 pages)

Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine,” *The Atlantic*, April 2016.

May 11: Contemporary Policy Issue Debate

Readings TBD