

PSCI 420: The Nuclear Revolution

**Williams College
Fall 2019**

Professor Galen Jackson

Schapiro 226

Email: 09gej@williams.edu

Telephone: x2760

Class Meeting Time: Monday/Thursday, 1:10-2:25 p.m.

Classroom: Hopkins Hall 002

Office Hours: Wednesdays, 2-4 p.m. and by appointment

Course Description

This is a class about international politics in the nuclear age. In broad terms, it focuses on a very basic question: Does international politics still work essentially the same way as it did in the pre-nuclear era, or has it undergone a “revolution,” in the most fundamental sense of the word? More specifically, the course addresses a number of major conceptual and strategic debates in the field of nuclear security studies: Do core political considerations play the same role that they did prior to 1945 in shaping state behavior, or has the advent of nuclear weapons altered the situation in a fundamental way? Do nuclear weapons have a stabilizing or destabilizing effect on the international system? Is the concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD) valid? Is strategic stability theory? Do nuclear weapons have any meaningful political value? Can they be used effectively to coerce a state’s adversaries? Does nuclear superiority matter? Does the balance of resolve? What is the morality of using nuclear forces, or of relying on them for deterrence? Is preventive war ever a justifiable policy in the nuclear age? Is great power war now basically obsolete, given these weapons’ destructive potential? Is strategy? How do states compete in a nuclear world? How difficult is it to defend allies by threatening to use nuclear weapons? How should the world approach the question of nuclear proliferation? Would more nuclear weapons actually make the world safer? Why do states develop nuclear weapons in the first place? How secure are the world’s nuclear arsenals today? And why, despite their having come on the scene more than seven decades ago, have nuclear weapons not been used in war since August 1945? The course will consider these questions from an interdisciplinary perspective that combines political science concepts with an historical approach to the evidence.

The class begins with a broad technical overview of the Manhattan Project, nuclear technology, and the effects of nuclear weapons. This obviously is not a physics course, but it is important that students have at least a basic technical understanding of nuclear issues in order for the rest of the class to be fully comprehensible. Students will *not* be tested on this material and we will move through it very slowly so that no one gets lost.

The heart of the course will center on a series of major historical and conceptual debates. Specifically, the class will examine the United States’ decision to drop atomic bombs on Japan in August 1945; early thinking about the implications of nuclear weapons for international

relations; early arms control efforts; the Soviet bomb project; the development and implications of thermonuclear weapons; extended deterrence; the Berlin and Cuban missile crises; the theory of the nuclear revolution in light of the middle Cold War period; nuclear accidents; nuclear terrorism; illicit nuclear networks; the future of nuclear energy; regional nuclear programs, including those in China, the Middle East, India, and Pakistan; preventive strikes on nuclear facilities; debates over what has come to be called nuclear “proliferation”; and contemporary issues, including questions related to North Korea, Iran, the emerging nuclear rivalry among the great powers, and fundamental issues of strategic doctrine.

Course Requirements and Format

Class Participation

This is a 400-level seminar and I will treat it as a graduate-level course. Quite simply, this class will not work without consistent input from students. Although I will begin most class sessions by providing some background and context related to the day’s topic and readings, class participation is critically important and expected of each and every student. Class discussion is *the heart of this course*—it is during these discussions that we will really wrestle with the fundamental issues at stake. I expect students to come to class prepared to discuss the readings, ask questions, and engage with their peers. If you don’t want to participate in class, then this course, frankly, is probably not for you. It is the students, rather than myself, who will be driving the discussion. The basic format for each session will be “Socratic,” meaning I will ask questions and structure the debate to get students to express key ideas and to think analytically. The goal of this method is to teach students *how* to think and argue, rather than *what* to think and argue. Because of its importance, **class participation will account for 20 percent of the final grade.**

Short Presentations

As part of the class participation grade, students will be responsible for **presenting on a reading or set of readings** we will be discussing in class for roughly ten minutes. The purpose of these short presentations is to frame the discussion for your classmates. Students should present their basic reactions to the issues raised in the readings and introduce a set of questions. Likewise, they should provide a set of analytical takeaways and be ready to take a leading role debating the issues that come up as part of the class discussion. I will assign students their classes early in the semester so that they have time to prepare and plan their schedules accordingly.

Two Short Analytical Essays

Students will also be required to write **two analytical papers, six to eight pages in length**, which will deal with particular subjects we have covered in class. Students will be given a choice of several topics to write about. I will hand out the different essay prompts roughly 7-10 days prior to when each is due. Students will be evaluated based on the quality of their writing; demonstrated knowledge of the subject material and readings; and, above all, the persuasiveness and clarity of the analytical argument they make. It is much better to write a paper with a bad argument than one with no argument at all. Papers that merely summarize the material we have discussed—even though they may demonstrate that one has carefully done the assigned

reading—will not fare as well as papers that incorporate less of the subject matter but take a clear position. The most important thing is for students to *advance a clear, compelling, and analytical argument*. These papers will *not* require research. They must include references to the readings using properly formatted citations. I will go over in class more thoroughly what I am expecting.

The first paper is due on **Monday, October 14 at 5 p.m.** during reading period and will be worth **20 percent of the final grade**. The second paper is due on **Monday, November 18 at 5 p.m.** and will be worth **25 percent of the final grade**. **We will not meet as a class that day so that you can focus on writing.** Late papers will be penalized a half letter grade per day past the deadline. Since I am requiring you to write papers, it is only fair that I provide you with extensive comments in a timely manner. I urge students to consider my feedback carefully. The goal is to make you all better writers and thinkers. If you have questions about what I have written on your paper, please drop by my office hours to discuss them.

Final Paper

Students will also be required to write a final paper, 12-15 pages in length, dealing with a broader thematic question from the course. Students will again be given a choice of several topics to write about and will have roughly ten days to finish it. Evaluation will be based on the same criteria as the shorter analytical essays. I will talk about this paper in greater detail toward the end of the semester. **This paper will be due during finals period and will be worth 35 percent of the overall grade.**

How to Read and Write for this Course

A key goal of this course is to help students improve their ability to read critically. Everything we will read advances a basic point. While doing the assigned reading, students should ask themselves a series of questions: What is the author's basic argument? What is the logic that supports that argument? Is the evidence that she/he brings to bear compelling? Students who read actively in this way will not only absorb the material more thoroughly, but will also come to class ready to participate with greater confidence. The goal should be to dissect the piece—to understand its logical and empirical weaknesses/strengths and to comprehend its significance in conceptual, historical, and policy terms. In addition, **students should pay especially careful attention to the primary documents we read in this course**. Those sources are the empirical leverage we have for assessing the various arguments and perspectives we will be discussing.

Writing development is also an important objective. The ability to write well is an invaluable skill, one that will benefit students in the future. The papers must have a clear thesis statement (typically stated at the end of the first paragraph) and the logical/empirical arguments students include in their papers should be geared toward supporting that statement. Likewise, each body paragraph should begin with a clear topic sentence, which is then supported by the analysis provided in the remainder of that paragraph. I am happy to discuss the structure, organization, logic, and evidence relating to student essays during office hours, but I will not read rough drafts. Again, we will discuss this in class in greater detail.

Office Hours

Please feel free to send me an email to set up an appointment or simply come by my office on Wednesdays between 2 and 4 p.m. I am happy to talk about anything related to the course and to try to answer any questions you might have. In my experience, office hours can present an excellent opportunity for students to enhance their comprehension of the concepts we discuss in class and to develop a framework for their papers, so I encourage everyone who feels they need help—or is simply interested in further discussion of the class material—to set up a meeting.

Academic Integrity and the Honor Code

All submitted work must be your own. I take plagiarism and cheating extremely seriously and will not hesitate to pursue the maximum penalty allowed by the College. If you are confused about what might constitute plagiarism or cheating, or have questions about specific aspects of the Honor Code, feel free to come talk to me or to consult the many resources the College provides to help students in this area. I am always happy to advise students about this issue.

On the issue of student collaboration, my policy is straightforward. There is absolutely nothing wrong with students exchanging ideas about what they plan to do in their papers. In fact, I welcome that sort of collaboration. **However, all written work must be done independently and students must formulate their own arguments in their papers.**

Issues of Health and Accessibility of Key Resources

Students with disabilities who may need an accommodation can contact Dr. G.L. Wallace at x4672. In addition, students experiencing physical or mental health challenges that is affecting their academic performance can come speak with me or with a dean so that they can be given access to the right resources. The deans can be reached at x4171.

A Note about Classroom Inclusivity

Some of the topics we will study in this class are controversial. It is only natural that students will disagree with me and with each other about certain concepts and events covered in this course. That is no bad thing—having these debates is vitally important to improving our collective understanding of these issues. So please feel free to express your opinions confidently in class. On the other hand, **I will not tolerate students being disrespectful to each other.** Class can only take place in an environment where everyone feels welcome and able to express themselves. With that in mind, I want to remind students that the College is committed to embracing diversity of age, background, beliefs, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, gender expression, national origin, religious affiliation, sexual orientation, and other visible and nonvisible categories. If you feel you are not being welcomed in this class or that it suffers from a lack of inclusivity, please come talk to me or to a college administrator to share your concerns.

Computer and Phone Policy

In previous years I have allowed students to use their computers to take notes during class. But as the saying goes, one bad apple can spoil the bunch. I have simply seen too many students be distracted by other students' misuse of their computers in class to continue to allow them. Phones likewise must be turned off or silenced during class. However, if you have an accommodation that allows you to use such devices, please bring it to my attention.

A Few Things to Keep in Mind

There are no assigned books for this class. The readings will all be included in a series of **course packets**, which students can pick up from my office (Schapiro 226).

Please note that we will have a **special class meeting the night of Wednesday, October 16 at 7 p.m.** to watch the film *Dr. Strangelove*. This meeting will compensate for us **not having class on Thursday, September 19**. Food and beverages will be provided at the film's screening.

Some of what we study in this class can be very hard to talk about. Whenever nuclear war is the topic of discussion there are going to be some troubling aspects of the conversation. If you find you are having difficulties for this reason, please come speak to me.

Course Schedule

Thursday, September 5: Introduction to the Course (no reading)

Monday, September 9: Technical Background (137 pages)

Richard Wolfson, *Nuclear Choices: A Citizen's Guide to Nuclear Technology*, Revised Edition (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), pp. 15-38, 95-97, 101-118, 289-304, 315-337.

Owen Cote, Jr., "Weapons of Mass Confusion," *Boston Review*, April 1, 2003.

McGeorge Bundy, *Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years* (New York: Random House, 1988), pp. 4-11, 14-53.

Thursday, September 12: The Decision to Drop the Bombs on Japan (88 pages)

Henry L. Stimson, "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb," *Harper's Magazine*, Vol. 194, No. 1161 (1947), pp. 97-107 (reprinted in *SAIS Review*, Vol. 5, No. 2 [1985], pp. 1-15).

Paul Fussell, "Thank God for the Atom Bomb," *The New Republic*, August 1981.

Ward Wilson, "The Winning Weapon? Rethinking Nuclear Weapons in Light of Hiroshima," *International Security*, Vol. 31, No. 4 (2007), pp. 162-179.

Barton J. Bernstein, "The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 1

(1995), pp. 135-152.

Gar Alperovitz, "Did America Have to Drop the Bomb? Not to End the War, But Truman Wanted to Intimidate Russia," *Washington Post*, August 4, 1985.

Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (New York: Basic, 1977), pp. 262-267.

Robert James Mattox, "Atomic Diplomacy: A Study in Creative Writing," *Journal of American History*, Vol. 59, No. 4 (1973), pp. 925-934.

Monday, September 16: Grappling with the Implications (119 pages)

Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 605-610.

Bernard Brodie, "War in the Atomic Age," in Bernard Brodie, ed., *The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946), pp. 21-69.

Bernard Brodie, "Implications for Military Policy," in *The Absolute Weapon*, pp. 70-77.

David Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), pp. 116-133, 150-161, 166-171, 253-272.

Thursday, September 19: NO CLASS

Monday, September 23: Strategy in the Thermonuclear Age (127 pages)

Wolfson, *Nuclear Choices*, pp. 97-100, 304-307.

Bundy, *Danger and Survival*, pp. 158-161, 176-184, 197-231.

Bernard Brodie, "Strategy Hits a Dead End," *Harper's Magazine* (October 1955), pp. 33-37.

Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 35-49, 69-78, 92-109, 116-125.

Michael Krepon, "The Stability-Instability Paradox," *Arms Control Wonk*, November 2, 2010.

Elbridge Colby, "If You Want Peace, Prepare for Nuclear War: A Strategy for the New Great-Power Rivalry," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 97, No. 6 (2018), pp. 25-32.

Thursday, September 26: The Extended Deterrence Problem (86 pages)

Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. vii-x, 146-200.

Francis J. Gavin, *Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America's Atomic Age* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012), pp. 30-56.

Monday, September 30: The Berlin Crisis (61 pages)

Gavin, *Nuclear Statecraft*, pp. 57-74.

Fred Kaplan, "JFK's First-Strike Plan," *The Atlantic*, October 2001.

John Ausland, "A Nuclear War to Keep Berlin Open?" *International Herald Tribune*, June 19, 1991.

Primary Documents:

- Memorandum (Memo) of a Conference with President John F. Kennedy, February 6, 1961, in United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1961-1963*, Vol. 8: *National Security Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office [GPO], 1996), pp. 27-28.
- Telegram from the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State, May 27, 1961, in *FRUS, 1961-1963*, Vol. 14: *Berlin Crisis, 1961-1962* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1993), pp. 77-78.
- Excerpt of Record of Meeting of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Berlin Contingency Planning, June 16, 1961, in *FRUS, 1961-1963*, Vol. 14, pp. 119-122.
- Paper Prepared by Thomas C. Schelling, "Nuclear Strategy in the Berlin Crisis," July 5, 1961, in *FRUS, 1961-1963*, Vol. 14, pp. 170-172.
- Letter from Kennedy to His Representative in Berlin, Lucius Clay, October 8, 1961, in *FRUS, 1961-1963*, Vol. 14, pp. 484-486.
- Letter from the Ambassador to Yugoslavia, George Kennan, to the Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Llewellyn Thompson, February 9, 1962, in *FRUS, 1961-1963*, Vol. 14, pp. 802-804.
- Memo from Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to Kennedy, "Subject: US and Soviet Military Buildup and Probable Effects on Berlin Situation," June 21, 1962, in *FRUS, 1961-1963*, Vol. 15: *Berlin Crisis, 1962-1963* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1994), pp. 192-195.
- Memorandum of Conversation (Memcon), "Subject: Berlin," October 9, 1962, in *FRUS, 1961-1963*, Vol. 15, pp. 351-355.
- Summary Record of the 517th Meeting of the National Security Council (NSC), September 12, 1963, in *FRUS, 1961-1963*, Vol. 8, pp. 499-507.

Thursday, October 3: The Cuban Missile Crisis (121 pages)

Michael Dobbs, *One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War* (New York: Vintage, 2008), pp. 3-11, 14-16, 20-23, 30-38, 67-73, 84-85, 94-100, 112-114, 163-165, 188-190, 198-201, 215-218, 227-238, 248-250, 265-268, 270-271, 290-293, 295-296, 303-309, 311-313, 321-326, 334-336.

Francis J. Gavin, “Lessons from the Cuban Missile Crisis,” *The National Interest*, October 26, 2012.

Leslie H. Gelb, “The Myth That Screwed Up 50 Years of U.S. Foreign Policy,” *Foreign Policy*, October 8, 2012.

Stephen Sestanovich, “Of Myths and Missiles,” *Foreign Policy*, October 12, 2012.

Daniel Ellsberg, “The Day Castro Almost Started World War III,” *New York Times*, October 31, 1987.

Primary Documents:

- Telegram from Cuban President Fidel Castro to Soviet General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev, October 26, 1962.
- Letter from Khrushchev to Castro, October 28, 1962.
- The Polyansky Report on Khrushchev’s Mistakes in Foreign Policy, October 1964.

Monday, October 7: The Theory of the Nuclear Revolution (103 pages)

Robert Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 1-45.

Primary Documents:

- Excerpts of Minutes of an NSC Meeting, February 19, 1969.
- Memcon, “Subject: NSC Meeting—NATO & MBFR,” November 19, 1970.
- Excerpt of an Editorial Note, in *FRUS, 1969-1976*, Vol. 14: *Soviet Union, October 1971-May 1972* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2006), pp. 74-75.
- Conversation between President Richard Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, April 4, 1972, in *FRUS, 1969-1976*, Vol. 14, pp. 258-260.
- Memo for the Record, “Subject: NSC Meeting, Wednesday, June 10, 1970—Middle

East,” June 10, 1970, in *FRUS, 1969-1976*, Vol. 23: *Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969-1972* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2015), pp. 419-432.

- Excerpts of Memcon between Kissinger and French President Georges Pompidou, May 18, 1973.
- Memcon, December 19, 1974, in *FRUS, 1969-1976*, Vol. 16: *Soviet Union, August 1974-December 1976* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2012), pp. 387-388.
- Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, “Subject: Middle East,” January 14, 1975, in *FRUS, 1969-1976*, Vol. 26: *Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974-1976* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2012), pp. 476-490.

Thursday, October 10: Does the Strategic Balance Matter? (93 pages)

Matthew Kroenig, “Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve: Explaining Nuclear Crisis Outcomes,” *International Organization*, Vol. 67, No. 1 (2013), pp. 141-171.

Francis J. Gavin, “What We Talk About When We Talk About Nuclear Weapons,” *H-Diplo/ISSF*, Forum No. 2 (2014), pp. 11-36.

Brendan Rittenhouse Green and Austin Long, “The MAD Who Wasn’t There: Soviet Reactions to the Late Cold War Nuclear Balance,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 4 (2017), pp. 606-641.

Monday, October 14: NO CLASS—FIRST PAPERS DUE AT 5 P.M.

SPECIAL CLASS MEETING—Wednesday, October 16, 7 p.m.: Watch *Dr. Strangelove*

Thursday, October 17: Nuclear Safety I—Accidents (67 pages)

Scott D. Sagan, *The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 11-52.

Dobbs, *One Minute to Midnight*, pp. 132-134, 254-255, 258-265, 271-275.

Eric Schlosser, *Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety* (New York: Penguin, 2013), pp. 245-249.

Pauline Jelinek, “70 Punished in Accidental B-52 Flight,” *Washington Post*, October 19, 2007.

Monday, October 21: Nuclear Safety II—Security of Arsenals (102 pages)

Gavin, *Nuclear Statecraft*, pp. 143-146.

John Mueller, “The Atomic Terrorist?” Paper Prepared for the International Commission on

Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, April 30, 2009.

Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “Why States Won’t Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists,” *International Security*, Vol. 38, No. 1 (2013), pp. 80-104.

Graham Allison, “A Response to Nuclear Terrorism Skeptics,” *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2009), pp. 31-44.

Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Great Debate: Is Nuclear Zero the Best Option,” *The National Interest* (September/October 2010), pp. 88-96.

Catherine Collins and Douglas Frantz, “The Long Shadow of A.Q. Khan: How One Scientist Helped the World Go Nuclear,” *Foreign Affairs*, January 31, 2018.

David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, “Unraveling the A.Q. Khan and Future Proliferation Networks,” *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 28, No. 2 (2005), pp. 111-128.

William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, “North Korea’s Missile Success Is Linked to Ukrainian Plant, Investigators Say,” *New York Times*, August 14, 2017.

Thursday, October 24: The Promise and Risks of Nuclear Energy (89 pages)

Wolfson, *Nuclear Choices*, pp. 182-212.

Nathan E. Hultman, “The Political Economy of Nuclear Energy,” *WIREs Climate Change*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (2011), pp. 397-411.

Leonard Weiss, “Atoms for Peace,” *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 59, No. 6 (2003), pp. 34-44.

Ernest Moniz, “Why We Still Need Nuclear Power,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 90, No. 6 (2011), pp. 83-94.

Charles D. Ferguson, “Japan Melted Down, But That Doesn’t Mean the End of the Atomic Age,” *Foreign Policy*, No. 189 (2011), pp. 49-53.

Brad Plumer, “U.S. Nuclear Comeback Stalls as Two Reactors Are Abandoned,” *New York Times*, July 31, 2017.

Brad Plumer, “How Retiring Nuclear Power Plants May Undercut U.S. Climate Goals,” *New York Times*, June 13, 2017.

Primary Documents:

- President Dwight Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” Address to the United Nations General Assembly, December 8, 1953.

- 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

Monday, October 28: Regional Nuclear Powers I—China (111 pages)

Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 3 (1996-1997), pp. 54-86.

John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, *China Builds the Bomb* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 1-34.

Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, “Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability,” *International Security*, Vol. 40, No. 2 (2015), pp. 7-50.

Thursday, October 31: Regional Nuclear Powers II—The Middle East (81 pages)

Vipin Narang, *Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), pp. 186-191.

Paul C. Avey, “Who’s Afraid of the Bomb? The Role of Nuclear Non-Use Norms in Confrontations between Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Opponents,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (2015), pp. 586-593.

Malfrid Braut-Hegghammer, *Unclear Physics: Why Iraq and Libya Failed to Build Nuclear Weapons* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016), pp. 1-13, 71-102, 196-217.

Handouts (will provide in class):

- Various Arab Officials’ Views of Israel’s Nuclear Capability
- American Policy during the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War

Monday, November 4: Regional Nuclear Powers III—India and Pakistan (82 pages)

Alexandre Debs and Nuno P. Monteiro, *Nuclear Politics: The Strategic Causes of Proliferation* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 238-245, 326-336.

Vipin Narang, “Posturing for Peace? Pakistan’s Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability,” *International Security*, Vol. 34, No. 3 (2009-2010), pp. 38-78.

Caitlin Talmadge, “Are Nuclear Weapons Keeping the India-Pakistan Crisis from Escalating—Or Making It More Dangerous?” *Washington Post Monkey Cage*, March 5, 2019.

Moed Yusuf, “How the India-Pakistan Conflict Leaves the Great Powers Powerless,” *Foreign Policy*, December 10, 2018.

David E. Sanger, “Obama’s Worst Pakistan Nightmare,” *New York Times*, January 8, 2009.

Rahmatullah Nabil, “The World Must Secure Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons,” *New York Times*, April 20, 2017.

Thursday, November 7: Debating Counterproliferation I (61 pages)

Marc Trachtenberg, “‘A Wasting Asset’: American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance, 1949-1954,” *International Security*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (1988-1989), pp. 5-49.

Rachel Elizabeth Whitlark, “Nuclear Beliefs: A Leader-Focused Theory of Counter-Proliferation,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 4 (2017), pp. 559-574.

Monday, November 11: Debating Counterproliferation II (129 pages)

Malfrid Braut-Hegghammer, “Revisiting Osirak: Preventive Attacks and Nuclear Proliferation Risks,” *International Security*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (2011), pp. 101-132.

Uri Sadot, “Osirak and the Counter-Proliferation Puzzle,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 4 (2016), pp. 646-676.

John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “An Unnecessary War,” *Foreign Policy*, No. 134 (January/February 2003), pp. 50-59.

Kenneth M. Pollack, “Next Stop Baghdad?” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 2 (2003), pp. 32-47.

Hal Brands and David Palkki, “Saddam, Israel, and the Bomb: Nuclear Alarmism Justified?” *International Security*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (2011), pp. 133-166.

Flynt Leverett, “Why Libya Gave Up on the Bomb,” *New York Times*, January 23, 2004.

Mark Mazzetti, “U.S. Finds Iran Halted Its Nuclear Arms Effort in 2003,” *New York Times*, December 4, 2007.

Thursday, November 14: Nonproliferation I—American Policy (98 pages)

Joe Cirincione, “Trump’s Nuclear Insanity,” *Politico Magazine*, March 30, 2016.

Avner Cohen and William Burr, “How the Israelis Hoodwinked JFK on Going Nuclear,” *Foreign Policy*, April 26, 2016.

Nicholas L. Miller, *Stopping the Bomb: The Sources and Effectiveness of US Nonproliferation Policy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018), pp. 97-103.

Rabia Akhtar, “The Correct Narrative on Pressler,” *Dawn*, May 29, 2017.

Primary Documents:

- Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union, July 15, 1963, in *FRUS, 1961-1963*, Vol. 7: *Arms Control and Disarmament* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1995), p. 801.
- Telegram from the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State, July 27, 1963, in *FRUS, 1961-1963*, Vol. 7, pp. 856-863.
- Excerpt of Memcon, “Subject: China—US Reaction to Soviet Destruction of CPR Nuclear Capability,” August 18, 1969.
- Memo from National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski to President Jimmy Carter, “Subject: Reflections on Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan,” December 26, 1979.
- Note from Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to Ambassador-at-Large Gerard Smith, January 31, 1980, enclosing excerpts from Memcons between Brown and Chinese Officials.
- Rick Atkinson, “Nuclear Parts Sought by Pakistanis,” *Washington Post*, July 21, 1984.
- Department of State Action Memo from Arnold Kanter and Richard Murphy to Michael Armacost, “Memo on Pakistan Nuclear Issue for the NSC,” August 24, 1984.
- Letter from President Ronald Reagan to President Zia-ul-Haq, September 12, 1984.
- Memcon, “Subject: Conversation between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Ben-Gurion,” May 30, 1961, in *FRUS, 1961-1963*, Vol. 17: *Near East, 1961-1962* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1994), pp. 134-135.
- Assistant Secretary of State Philips Talbot’s Notes of the Meeting between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, May 30, 1961.
- National Intelligence Estimate 35-61, “The Outlook for Israel,” October 5, 1961, pp. 2, 6-7.
- Memo from the Director of the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs Rodger P. Davies to Talbot, “Subject: Second Inspection of Israel’s Dimona Reactor,” December 27, 1962.
- Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel (enclosing a letter from Kennedy to Ben-Gurion), May 18, 1963, in *FRUS, 1962-1963*, Vol. 18: *Near East, 1962-1963* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1995), pp. 543-544.
- Memo for the Record of Deputy National Security Adviser Robert Komer’s Meeting with Mordechai Gazit of the Israeli Embassy, April 21, 1964.

- Memcon, “Subject: Nuclear Proliferation,” February 9, 1966, in *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. 18: *Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-1967* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2000), pp. 549-550.
- Memo for the Record, “Subject: President’s Talk with Israeli Foreign Minister Eban,” February 9, 1966, in *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. 18, pp. 547-549.
- Memo of Telephone Conversation between Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, November 1, 1968, in *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. 20: *Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967-1968* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2001), pp. 585-586.
- National Security Decision Memorandum 6, “Presidential Decision to Ratify Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,” February 5, 1969.
- Memo for the Record, “Subject: NSC Ad Hoc Review Group Meeting, Friday, June 20, 1969 on NSSM 40—Israeli Nuclear Program,” June 20, 1969, in *FRUS, 1969-1976*, Vol. 23, pp. 116-123.
- Memo from Kissinger to Nixon, “Israel’s Nuclear Program,” with Attached Tab A, “Summary of the Situation and Issues,” July 19, 1969.

Monday, November 18: NO CLASS—SECOND PAPERS DUE AT 5 P.M.

Thursday, November 21: Nonproliferation II—Would More Be Better? (65 pages)

Nicholas L. Miller, “Nuclear Dominoes: A Self-Defeating Prophecy?” *Security Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (2014), pp. 33-73.

Kenneth N. Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 84, No. 3 (1990), pp. 731-745.

Marc Trachtenberg, “Waltzing to Armageddon,” *The National Interest*, No. 69 (2002), pp. 144-152.

Monday, November 25: North Korea (63 pages)

Nicholas L. Miller and Vipin Narang, “North Korea Defied the Theoretical Odds: What Can We Learn from Its Successful Nuclearization?” *Texas National Security Review*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2018), pp. 58-74.

Ankit Panda and Vipin Narang, “Why North Korea Is Testing Missiles Again: Is a Much Larger Escalation on the Horizon?” *Foreign Affairs*, May 16, 2019.

Ankit Panda, “The Right Way to Manage a Nuclear North Korea: Exploring ‘Left-of-Launch’ Options Is a Dangerous Mistake,” *Foreign Affairs*, November 19, 2018.

Victor Cha and Katrin Fraser Katz, “The Right Way to Coerce North Korea: Ending the Threat Without Going to War,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 97, No. 3 (2018), pp. 87-100.

Joshua Shiffrin, “Learning to Love Kim’s Bomb: The Upside of a Nuclear-Armed North Korea,” *Foreign Affairs*, October 3, 2018.

Edward Luttwak, “It’s Time to Bomb North Korea,” *Foreign Policy*, January 8, 2018.

Robert Jervis and Mira Rapp-Hooper, “Perception and Misperception on the Korean Peninsula: How Unwanted Wars Begin,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 97, No. 3 (2018), pp. 103-117.

James Van de Velde, “Go Ahead: Let Japan and South Korea Go Nuclear,” *The National Interest*, October 1, 2016.

Thursday, November 28: NO CLASS—THANKSGIVING BREAK

Monday, December 2: Iran (76 pages)

Michael Crowley, “The Iran Crisis, Explained,” *New York Times*, June 17, 2019.

Kenneth N. Waltz, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 91, No. 4 (2012), pp. 2-5.

James M. Lindsay and Ray Takeyh, “After Iran Gets the Bomb: Containment and Its Complications,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 89, No. 2 (2010), pp. 33-49.

Michael R. Pompeo, “Confronting Iran: The Trump Administration’s Strategy,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 97, No. 6 (2018), pp. 60-71.

Bret Stephens, “A Deal for Iran: Normalization for Normalization,” *New York Times*, May 23, 2019.

Wendy Sherman, “How We Got the Iran Deal: And Why We’ll Miss It,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 97, No. 5 (2018), pp. 186-197.

Max Boot, “A War with Iran Would Be the Mother of All Quagmires,” *Washington Post*, May 20, 2019.

Ilan Goldenberg, “What a War with Iran Would Look Like: Neither Side Wants a Fight, but That Doesn’t Eliminate the Danger,” *Foreign Affairs*, June 4, 2019.

John J. Mearsheimer, “Iran Is Rushing to Build a Nuclear Weapon—and Trump Can’t Stop It,” *New York Times*, July 1, 2019.

Ali Vaez, “Trump’s ‘Maximum Pressure’ Won’t Make Iran Yield,” *The Atlantic*, May 12, 2019.

John R. Bolton, “To Stop Iran’s Bomb, Bomb Iran,” *New York Times*, March 26, 2015.

Matthew Kroenig, “Time to Attack Iran: Why a Strike is the Least Bad Option,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 91, No. 1 (2012), pp. 76-86.

David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “Saudis Want a Nuclear Deal—Can They Be Trusted Not to Build a Bomb?” *New York Times*, November 22, 2018.

Thursday, December 5: Doctrinal Debates and Future Nuclear Competition (64 pages)

Nina Tannenwald, “It’s Time for a U.S. No-First-Use Nuclear Policy,” in Policy Roundtable, “Nuclear First-Use and Presidential Authority,” *Texas National Security Review*, July 2, 2019.

John R. Harvey, “A Considered ‘No’ on ‘No First Use,’” in Policy Roundtable, “Nuclear First-Use and Presidential Authority.”

Brendan Rittenhouse Green, “Somewhere Between ‘Never’ and ‘Always,’” in Policy Roundtable, “Nuclear First-Use and Presidential Authority.”

Michael E. O’Hanlon, “Going It Alone? The President and the Risks of a Hair-Trigger Nuclear Button,” *Brookings*, March 1, 2016.

Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 2 (2006), pp. 42-54.

Bret Stephens, “The U.S. Needs More Nukes,” *New York Times*, August 9, 2019.

Ernest J. Moniz and Sam Nunn, “The New Nuclear Arms Race—and How Washington and Moscow Can Stop It,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 98, No. 5 (2019), pp. 150-161.

Nina Tannenwald, “The Vanishing Nuclear Taboo? How Disarmament Fell Apart,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 97, No. 6 (2018), pp. 16-24.